文章摘要
曾 勇.跨界水冲突博弈分析[J].水利学报,2011,42(2):
跨界水冲突博弈分析
Game analysis of transboundary water conflict
  
DOI:
中文关键词: 跨界  水量和水质冲突  博弈论  冲突协调  官厅水库流域
英文关键词: transboundary  water conflict  water quantity and quality  game theory  Guantin Reservoir watershed
基金项目:
作者单位
曾 勇 中国石油大学 (北京)地球科学学院 油气资源与探测国家重点实验室北京 102249 
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中文摘要:
      摘要:基于博弈论和最优化方法,考虑冲突参与人的非合作与合作行为、水资源的量与质、以及河道最小生态需 水要求,建立了二人博弈分析模型。以官厅水库流域张家口市和北京市跨界的水量和水质冲突为例,探讨冲突过 程中参与人决策的相互影响以及达到合作所需要的利益分配格局。研究结果表明:张家口和北京跨界水冲突的均 衡结果是 (非合作, 非合作) 的劣解,为改进到 (合作,合作) 的帕累托最优解,可对合作增加利益的公平分配实现:P=50%水文年型下,均衡结果的上游盈利为8.03亿元/a,下游为0元/a,通过下游给上游的旁支
英文摘要:
      Abstract: Considering a series of influence factors such as the cooperative and non-cooperative behaviors by conflict participants,the quality and quantity of water resource and the minimum instream ecological water demand,a two-person game analysis model was built to solve the transboundary water conflict on water quality and quantity based on the game theory and optimal approach. The transboundary water conflict on water quantity and quality of the Guanting Reservoir Basin between the Zhangjiakou and Beijing city is taken as a case study. The interactive infulence between conflict participants in their decision-making and the related profit distribution pattern for cooperation were explored. The results show that the double non-cooperative may lead to an inferior solution. In order to obtain a double cooperation optimal solution,a fair distribution of the increased profits on cooperation is necessary. Under P=50% water year pattern,the profits were estimated as 803×106 and zero Yuan/a for upstream and downstream consumers respectively. If the downstream participant pays 1 041×106 Yuan/a to the upstream participant,the profits will be improved as 1 561×106and 759×106 Yuan/a for upstream and downstream consumers respectively. Under P = 95% water year pattern,if the downstream participant pays 3.32×106 Yuan/a to the upstream participant,the profits will be improved as 7.97×106 Yuan/a and 0.28×106 Yuan/a for upstream and downstream consumers respectively
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