文章摘要
水资源利用与排污控制的非合作博弈方法
Non-Cooperative Game Theory Method for Water Resources Utilization and Pollution Control
投稿时间:2021-04-16  修订日期:2021-08-18
DOI:
中文关键词: 经济效益  排污总量  讨价还价博弈  主从博弈  非劣解  均衡解
英文关键词: economic benefit  total pollutant discharge  bargaining games  leader-followers games  non-inferior solution  Nash equilibrium solution
基金项目:国家自然科学(51979199):
作者单位邮编
付湘 武汉大学 水资源与水电工程科学国家重点实验室
海绵城市建设水系流科学湖北省重点实验室 
430072
谈广鸣 武汉大学 水资源与水电工程科学国家重点实验室
海绵城市建设水系流科学湖北省重点实验室 
430072
黄莎 武汉大学 水资源与水电工程科学国家重点实验室 
刘双郡 武汉大学 水资源与水电工程科学国家重点实验室 
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中文摘要:
      为在水环境保护优先的前提下保障水资源持续利用,通过分析水资源经济利用主体与水环境保护主体的目标冲突,建立水资源利用与排污控制的讨价还价博弈模型与主从博弈模型,提出水资源利用与排污控制互馈决策的协调方法,并对比分析均衡解与非劣解的内涵与关系。以洞庭湖四口河系地区为研究区域,结果表明:讨价还价博弈和主从博弈方法的均衡解均在多目标优化方法的非劣解前沿上,讨价还价博弈的均衡解范围远小于非劣解范围;主从博弈得到了唯一的均衡解,比讨价还价博弈的均衡解更有效地控制了污染物排放量。研究为水资源利用与水环境保护冲突管理提供了新的协调方法。
英文摘要:
      For ensuring water resources continuous utilization under the priority of water environmental protection, the objective conflicts between economic use of water resources and environmental protection are analyzed in this paper. The bargaining games model and leader-followers games model are established for water resource utilization and pollution control. This paper proposes the coordination method of mutual feedback decision, and analyses the relationship of Nash equilibrium solution and non-inferior solution. Taking Four-Inlet river net area of Dongting Lake as study area, the result shows that the equilibrium solutions of the bargaining games and the leader-followers games method are both at the frontier of the non-inferior solution of the multi-objective optimization method. The equilibrium solution range of the bargaining game is much smaller than non-inferior solution range. Moreover, the leader-followers games model obtains the only equilibrium solution, which can more effectively control total pollutant discharge. This research provides a new coordination method for conflict management between water resources utilization and environment protection.
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